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Article X appears to have received little attention 
during the construction of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). However, as 
the convention has evolved Article X has become 
increasingly important to many states, to the 
extent that progress in the Eighth Review 
Conference will be dependent on a balanced 
package of measures, including measures that 
attend to this article. Accordingly, this short paper 
is intended to outline some options for improving 
the implementation of Article X that states parties 
may wish to consider at the Eighth Review 
Conference.  
The paper begins by outlining the origins and 
evolution of Article X over the course of the 
BWC’s history. It then proceeds to discuss the 
changing expectations of states from this article, 
but also the limits of what can realistically be 
expected, before presenting a number of possible 
options to move Article X forward, based on 
activities undertaken in other fields.  
Origins and Evolution of Article X 
It has long been recognized that the agents, 
equipment and materials required for biological 
warfare are dual use, in that they could be applied 
for peaceful, but also hostile purposes. Early 
efforts towards the integration of a provision on 
peaceful purposes in biological disarmament 
measures can be seen in Article X of the Socialist 
states’ Draft Convention on Bacteriological 
(biological) Weapons from March 1971.1 The 
language in this early Soviet proposal drew, in 
part, from Article IV of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and was kept largely 
unchanged in subsequent drafts, except for the 
addition of text from Neutral and Non-Aligned 
states “directed towards the promotion of co-
operation” in August of 1971.2 The Article appears 
to have been “generally found constructive”,3 with 
little to suggest Article X proved divisive and the 
US Ambassador, James Leonard, indicating that 
he believed the “…article, perhaps more than any 
                                                
1 SIPRI. 1971. “CB Disarmament Negotiations 1920-1970.” Ahnqvist 
& Wiksells. pg 334.  
2 CCD/PV.530. August 17, 1971. Pg 26.  
3 SIPRI. 1971. Op Cit, pg, 319. 
other, reflects the basic objective of our 
negotiations: to turn scientific efforts from the 
paths of destruction to the service of mankind”.4 
However, as early as the First Review 
Conference, expectations over the function and 
focus of Article X began to diverge. This was 
compounded by changes in the perceived value 
of biotechnology and other influences creating a 
growing sense of division around Article X.  
The situation improved little during the 1990s. 
Although the technical focus of VEREX meant that 
the issue was largely avoided in the early 1990s, 
in the run up to - and during - the 1996 Special 
Conference the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) 
indicated renewed attention to international 
cooperation. During the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) 
negotiations Article X became one of four “equally 
important” areas5 that was becoming increasingly 
divisive. 
Since the conclusion of the work of the AHG, 
Article X has continued to prove divisive. At the 
Sixth Review Conference, proposals for Article X 
and Article IV Action Plans effectively cancelled 
each other out. The Seventh Review Conference 
saw a repetition of “well-known points of 
conflict”, with Western states seeking to narrow 
the focus of the Article around disease-related 
activities, and others, principally from the NAM 
seeking to broaden its focus. 6  
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The BWC is a disarmament treaty, but attention 
to international cooperation will be essential for 
success at the 8th Review Conference. Five 
balanced options for Article X are identified:  
• Establish a format for national reports,  
• Appoint an ISU “Cooperation officer”;  
• Undertake a voluntary peer review of Article X;  
• Establish regional technical workshops; 
• Launch an Article X Working Group.   
Individually or collectively these options could aid 
in the development of a balanced package of 
measures during the Eighth Review Conference.   
Expectations under Article X 
As such, the passage of time has generated a 
divergence of expectations around the focus and 
function of Article X. Regarding the function, the 
language can be interpreted as having a 
“promotional aspect and a regulatory aspect”.7 
The NAM has increasingly emphasised the 
promotional aspect of Article X; for some other 
states the emphasis has been on the obligation to 
avoid hindering international cooperation and/or 
technology transfer.  
In terms of the focus, as Table 1 illustrates, the 
range of activities specifically linked to Article X 
has grown considerably as the convention has 
evolved. Notably, through internal or exogenous 
activities many of these measures have been 
taken forward: the Seventh Review Conference 
agreed a Database; WHO activities, such as the 
implementation of the IHR have advanced global 
disease monitoring; and the rise of the internet (as 
well as the recent trend towards ‘open access’ 
publications) has to some extent facilitated 
greater international exchanges of information.  
Table 1. Examples of Specific Measures for Article X 
in Final Declarations8 
Examples of measures for Article X 
agreed in Final Declarations 
Review Con 
1 2 3 4 6 7 
Increase/promote scientific and 
technological co-operation • • • • • • 
Transfer and exchange of 
information • • • • • • 
Training of personnel/capacity 
building • • • • • • 
Transfer of materials and 
equipment  • • • • • • 
Background materials on Article X 
(by UN Secretariat or ISU) • • • • • • 
Active promotion of contracts 
(including by ISU)   • • • •  
Greater co-operation in 
international public health/disease 
control 
 • • • • • 
Coordination through UN system  • • • • • 
Co-ordination/improvement of 
national & regional programmes  • • • • • 
Bilateral, regional and multi-
regional agreements related to 
disease  
 • • • • • 
Institutional ways of ensuring 
multilateral cooperation  • • • • • 
Inclusion on the agenda of a 
relevant United Nations body,  • • •   
Information on implementation of 
Art X to Secretary-General/ISU   • • • • 
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Participation of/measures by 
specialized agencies   • • • • 
Information, assistance or 
communications  on disease 
surveillance & detections systems 
  • • •  
Establishment of a world data bank   • •   
Study of the influence of enhanced 
radioactivity on microorganisms   •    
Programme or promotion of 
vaccine development including 
public-private partnership 
  • • • • 
The promotion of programmes for 
the exchange and training of 
scientists and experts 
   •  • 
Develop emergency & disaster 
management plans;     • • 
Review national regulations on 
exchanges and transfers      • 
Capacity-building, in biosafety, 
biosecurity, disease detection, 
reporting and response.  
     • 
“A dose of realism” 
It is not unreasonable for states - particularly 
those untroubled by the threat of biological 
weapons but facing very real challenges from 
natural disease outbreaks - to expect some form 
of incentive for signing and ratifying the BWC. 
However, there is also a need for “a dose of 
realism”9 in expectations surrounding Article X.  
First, for many the BWC is a disarmament 
agreement intended to build security through the 
prohibition of a particular means of warfare, it is 
not a development treaty. Moreover, there are 
already a number of cooperative activities taking 
place outside the convention that should not be 
duplicated. Second, as successive review 
conferences have pointed out, the private sector 
plays an “important role”, with technology 
frequently in the control of private industry not 
states.  
Third, the literature on technology transfer and 
capacity development points to the importance of 
recipient states’ capacity; and making the most of 
cooperative activities requires effort on the part of 
the recipient, such as the provision of political 
will, institutional resources and the development 
of skills, competencies and a suitable 
environment to effectively absorb technology 
transfers.10 Finally, as noted during the AHG, any 
feasible measure for Article X must be reasonably 
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inexpensive, easy to implement and not require 
disclosure of intellectual property.11 
Options for Article X  
Whilst there is therefore a need for realism, it is 
also apparent that progress at the Eighth Review 
Conference will require a balanced package of 
measures, and the implementation of Article X will 
form a significant part of that balance. 
Accordingly, what follows is a series of ideas 
taken from past BWC proposals and other 
international agreements. These are intended as 
‘balanceable’ food-for-thought for those seeking 
options in this area.  
Article X reports  
A number of states parties have submitted 
information on Article X activities either as 
background for Review Conferences or during 
Intersessional Process meetings.12 At the Seventh 
Review Conference, such national submissions 
averaged just under two and a half pages in 
length, with content ranging significantly from 
short statements on compliance with Article X, to 
longer illustrative lists of relevant activities, to 
statements and proposals for Article X-related 
activities and mechanisms.13  
If these reports are considered as potentially 
useful, a common format for such reports - 
potentially adapting prior work in the AHG14 - 
could be developed with a view to generating 
more concrete and consistent data on: firstly, 
what states are doing in terms of Article X; and, 
secondly, identifying particular needs of states 
parties related to Article X, such as specific 
requests for “equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information”.15 Such an 
approach could be useful in the development of 
background information on trends in relation to 
this article and could be used to inform 
subsequent discussion in this area, perhaps even 
feeding into the initiation of an iterative process of 
determining reasonable expectations under 
Article X. 
Appoint an ISU “Cooperation officer”  
The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) is not “an 
operational agency in the field of international co-
operation”.16 Nevertheless, if states are serious 
about international cooperation and technology 
transfer under the BWC then there would be 
                                                
11 BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.25. pg 1.  
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14 See BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.350 
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value in expanding the ISU to include a 
cooperation officer tasked with, inter alia, actively 
working on the identification, collation and 
circulation of opportunities for relevant 
cooperation and capacity building, such as 
scholarships, e-learning courses, and funding 
opportunities.  
Focused attention on Article X and the active 
identification and sharing of opportunities is likely 
to be a prerequisite for enhancing the 
effectiveness of this Article and could be used to 
populate the existing database and facilitate a 
process of matchmaking offers with needs. A 
cooperation officer could, moreover, play a role in 
informing states parties of opportunities for 
coordinating cooperation with other relevant 
international and regional organizations.17 
Peer review of Article X  
Several states have embarked upon some form of 
BWC-related peer review process. Most of these 
focus on aspects of national implementation of 
the BWC. However, building on the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) review 
process a potential option may be consideration 
of a process of voluntary peer review of national 
activities in relation to Article X to “provide in-
depth examinations of development systems and 
policies, including lessons learned”.18 In this 
regard, Article X reports and other materials could 
be used to inform a desk-based review process 
of Article X related activities with a view to 
developing an understanding of how technology 
transfer and receipt could be optimized in the 
BWC context.  
Consistent with the DAC model, a more ambitious 
Article X peer review process could be developed 
through visits that “gain an understanding of how 
policies are implemented”.19 During the AHG 
discussions several states raised the idea of 
cooperation visits to facilities with the aim of 
providing technical assistance on biosafety and 
security, regulations, diagnostic techniques,20 as 
well as the provision of technical knowledge to 
solve problems identified by states parties.  
Regional technical workshops  
The Preparatory Committee indicated that there is 
widespread support for further work on science 
and technology, moreover, scientific or technical 
conferences provide a key mechanism for the 
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exchange of scientific and technological 
information and the stimulation of cooperation in 
the life sciences. A further useful option may 
therefore be organising a technical workshop or 
series of regional workshops to serve as a “forum 
for scientists from around the world to exchange 
knowledge and share advances”21 in topics of 
relevance to the BWC, such as disease detection 
and response, tailored to regional needs. These 
meetings could be located in United Nations 
regional centres, such as the UN Regional Centre 
for Peace, Disarmament and Development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean or the UN 
Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in 
Africa. This could usefully complement future 
science and technology related activities under 
the convention, building on a number of existing 
models such as Agricultural Technical 
Cooperation Working Group (ATCWG) workshops 
on Capacity Building for Emerging Infectious 
Diseases.  
Article X Working Group 
A further option for consideration is an Article X 
working group of some form mandated over the 
course of the next intersessional period to review 
background materials, actively identify and share 
opportunities to promote and coordinate 
international cooperation and capacity building 
for peaceful purposes. The group might also be 
tasked to identify gaps and obstacles that need 
to be addressed and potentially explore methods 
for consultation and cooperation with any 
problems that might arise related to the 
implementation of Article X.  
In order to ensure continuity and focus, there 
would be benefits to appointing a Chair of the 
working group for the duration of the 
intersessional period. The Chair, with the support 
of the ISU, could usefully identify and invite 
experts in particular areas, such as technology 
transfer, to inform the group’s discussion. 
Building on expert contributions and discussion, 
there would also be considerable benefits to such 
a group, in circumstances where consensus 
existed, being able to make recommendations for 
consideration at subsequent meetings of states 
parties.  
Reflections 
The negotiation record indicates that Article X 
was considered important when it was introduced 
into the text in 1971. Indeed, as Ambassador Ene 
of Romania recalled in his statement to the First 
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Review Conference, Article X “occupied a special 
place in the structure of the Convention”.22 It also 
appears to have been uncontroversial in the early 
1970s. However, more recent history suggests 
that Article X could prove divisive at the Eighth 
BWC Review Conference.  
Whilst the underlying differences in interpretations 
of the Article that have emerged since the 1980s 
are unlikely to be overcome at the Review 
Conference, the extent of division which may 
emerge is likely to depend on the preparations of 
states parties. To this end, the discussions and 
understandings achieved during the standing 
agenda item on Article X (and Article VII) during 
the last intersessional process and the two-part 
Preparatory Committee should serve states 
parties well. Indeed, already there are a number 
of proposals on the table for states parties to 
consider.  
If states parties are to move beyond the repetition 
and recycling of traditional debates over Article X, 
past experience suggests that proposals need to 
be concrete, relatively inexpensive, feasible, and 
not impinge upon private sector interests. It 
would also be beneficial if they were both 
ambitious in scope and submitted early. With this 
in mind, this paper has identified five potential 
additional options for consideration in relation to 
Article X:  
• Establish a format for national reports  
• Appoint an ISU “Cooperation officer”  
• Undertake a voluntary peer review of Article X  
• Establish regional technical workshops 
• Launch an Article X Working Group.  
Such options are unlikely to satisfy all states’ 
expectations, but individually or collectively these 
options could aid in the development of a 
balanced package of measures during the Eighth 
Review Conference, which would advance 
international cooperation in a manner that both 
complements and enhances proposals in other 
areas. 
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